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EXDIS

MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

GENEVA FOR USINF

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
 TAGS: PARM, MNUC, NATO  
 SUBJECT: INF: TEXT OF NITZE BRIEFING TO NAC MARCH 2

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT).

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF MID-ROUND INF  
 BRIEFING OF NAC MARCH 2 BY US CHIEF NEGOTIATOR  
 PAUL NITZE. NITZE'S BRIEFING WAS FOLLOWED BY REPORT BY  
 FRG ARMS CONTROL COMMISSIONER FRED RUTH ON HIS RECENT

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TRIP TO MOSCOW (USNATO 1451). ALLIED DISCUSSION FOLLOWING  
NITZE'S AND RUTH'S BRIEFINGS BEING REPORTED SEPTEL.  
END SUMMARY.

3. BEGIN TEXT:

INTRODUCTION

- I AM HAPPY TO BE IN BRUSSELS AGAIN TO BRIEF YOU ON THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES NEGOTIATIONS. AMBASSADOR GLITMAN REPORTED ON THE STATUS OF THE TALKS AT THE FEBRUARY 14 SCG. SINCE THAT TIME THE PRESIDENT HAS REAFFIRMED IN HIS AMERICAN LEGION SPEECH ON FEBRUARY 22 HIS DEEP COMMITMENT FOR AN INF AGREEMENT AND MADE PUBLIC SOME OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES THAT MUST BE INCLUDED IN SUCH AN AGREEMENT.

- I PLAN TO SUMMARIZE THE FIRST FOUR AND A HALF WEEKS OF THE CURRENT ROUND AND THEN WILL BE HAPPY TO ADDRESS ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE. THE TEXT OF MY STATEMENT WILL BE CIRCULATED.

- IN GENERAL, THE ATTITUDE SHOWN BY THE SOVIET SIDE IN THE CURRENT ROUND HAS BEEN DISAPPOINTING. WHILE CONTINUING TO REJECT ANY CONSIDERATION OR DISCUSSION OF OUR PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE THE CLASS OF UNITED STATES AND SOVIET LONGER RANGE INF MISSILES, THE SOVIETS HAVE FAILED TO OFFER AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE APPROACH THEY HAVE TAKEN SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AN APPROACH WHICH DOES NOT EVEN BEGIN TO ADDRESS THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS THAT PROMPTED NATO'S 1979 DECISION.

U.S. POSITION

- AT THE BEGINNING OF THE ROUND, WE EXPRESSED TO THE SOVIETS OUR CONTINUED BELIEF THAT THE ELIMINATION OF THE ENTIRE CLASS OF UNITED STATES AND SOVIET LRINF MISSILES CONSTITUTES THE MOST EQUITABLE AND EFFECTIVE OUTCOME FOR

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THE NEGOTIATIONS.

- AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE REITERATED OUR READINESS TO CONSIDER, AND IN FACT HAVE INVITED, ANY SERIOUS COUNTERPROPOSAL FROM THE SOVIET SIDE. WE HAVE OUTLINED AND EXPLAINED TO THE SOVIETS CERTAIN CRITERIA WHICH WE CONSIDER TO BE FUNDAMENTAL TO AN AGREEMENT AND BY WHICH WE WOULD EVALUATE ANY PROPOSAL. THESE CRITERIA INCLUDE:

- AN AGREEMENT MUST ENTAIL EQUAL RIGHTS AND LIMITS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION;
- AN AGREEMENT SHOULD ADDRESS ONLY THE SYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION;
- AN AGREEMENT SHOULD APPLY LIMITS TO INF MISSILES REGARDLESS OF LOCATION AND SHOULD NOT RESULT IN AN EXPORTATION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY PROBLEM TO THE FAR EAST;
- AN AGREEMENT LIMITING INF SHOULD NOT WEAKEN THE UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTION TO NATO'S CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE; AND
- AN AGREEMENT MUST BE VERIFIABLE.

- LET ME SAY NOW THAT THE SOVIET REACTION TO THESE CRITERIA, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF VERIFIABILITY, WAS NEGATIVE. THEY ASSERTED THAT THE CRITERIA WERE BASED

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ON FULLY UPHOLDING THE ZERO-ZERO PROPOSAL.

- IN ADDITION TO DESCRIBING TO THE SOVIETS THE CRITERIA WE BELIEVE ARE NECESSARY FOR AN ACCEPTABLE

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AGREEMENT, WE HAVE REVIEWED THE RATIONALE AND BACKGROUND UNDERLYING THE 1979 DECISION. OUR OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN AND IS TO BRING THE SOVIETS TO UNDERSTAND THE CONCERNS BEHIND THAT DECISION SO THAT THEIR POSITION WOULD BEGIN TO ADDRESS THOSE CONCERNS.

- AS IN THE LAST ROUND, WE HAVE SOUGHT TO MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD AT EVERY LEVEL, DESPITE DIFFERENCES OVER THE CENTRAL ISSUES. WE HAVE AGAIN EMPHASIZED THOSE AREAS WHERE THERE IS A DEGREE OF COMMONALITY BETWEEN THE APPROACHES OF THE TWO SIDES. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO "CLEAR AWAY THE UNDERBRUSH" SO THAT WHEN THE CENTRAL ISSUES ARE RESOLVED, AN AGREEMENT CAN BE QUICKLY CONCLUDED.

- TO THIS END, WE PROPOSED TO THE SOVIETS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT VERIFICATION WORKING GROUP, WHICH WOULD BEGIN ITS WORK BY DEVELOPING DESTRUCTION PROCEDURES. WE SEE THIS AS AN AREA WHERE PROGRESS COULD BE MADE, AS THE SIDES ENVISAGE DESTRUCTION OF MISSILES AS THE SOLE OR PRINCIPAL METHOD OF REDUCTION OF SUCH SYSTEMS.

- WE ALSO PROPOSED AN AGREEMENT ON THE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF LRINF BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHES AND TABLED A DRAFT TEXT OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT. WE PROPOSED THE FORMATION OF A JOINT WORKING GROUP TO ADDRESS THIS SUBJECT. AGAIN, WE FEEL THIS IS AN AREA WHERE PROGRESS COULD BE MADE; GIVEN THE ENDORSEMENT OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY ANDROPOV AND THE ALREADY NEGOTIATED PRECEDENTS FOR MISSILE LAUNCH NOTIFICATIONS, WE FEEL THAT AN EFFECTIVE AND USEFUL AGREEMENT COULD BE NEGOTIATED IN A RELATIVELY SHORT PERIOD OF TIME.

- WE ALSO ARE SEEKING TO MAKE WHATEVER PROGRESS IS POSSIBLE IN THE TREATY TEXT AND DATA WORKING GROUPS.

SOVIET POSITION

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- THE BASIC SOVIET POSITION, ITS SUBSTANTIVE CONSEQUENCES AND ITS APPARENT OBJECTIVES ARE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS THEY WERE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

- WE HAVE REBUTTED SOVIET ASSERTIONS OF MOVEMENT ON THEIR PART, REVIEWING THE HISTORY OF THEIR POSITION AND SHOWING THAT IT HAS REMAINED, IN ESSENCE, CONSTANT OVER THE LAST FIFTEEN MONTHS.

- IN THE VERY FIRST ROUND OF THE TALKS, THE SOVIETS PROPOSED THAT THE USSR AND NATO EACH REDUCE TO 300 "MEDIUM-RANGE" MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT IN OR "INTENDED FOR USE" IN EUROPE. AS AN ALTERNATIVE, THEY SAID THEY WERE ALSO READY TO REDUCE THEIR "MEDIUM-RANGE" FORCES TO THE LEVEL OF THOSE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE.

- EITHER OF THOSE PROPOSALS WOULD HAVE ENTAILED SEVERAL BASIC CONSEQUENCES:

-- FIRST, THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE PROHIBITED FROM DEPLOYING THE PERSHING II OR THE GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE IN EUROPE;

-- SECOND, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO MAINTAIN A VERY SUBSTANTIAL FORCE OF MODERN SS-20 MISSILE SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN USSR;

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-- THIRD, THERE WOULD BE NO CONSTRAINTS ON SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS OF SS-20 MISSILES OR OTHER "MEDIUM-RANGE" SYSTEMS IN THE EASTERN USSR DESPITE THE FACT THAT SUCH SYSTEMS IMPINGE ON EUROPEAN

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- SECURITY; AND

-- FOURTH, VIRTUALLY ALL OR ALL UNITED STATES DUAL-  
- CAPABLE AIRCRAFT WOULD BE ELIMINATED FROM EUROPE.

- THE ADJUSTMENTS THE SOVIETS HAVE THUS FAR MADE IN THEIR POSITION, INCLUDING THE MISSILE SUBCEILING PROPOSAL LINKED TO THE NUMBER OF BRITISH AND FRENCH "MEDIUM-RANGE" MISSILES, IN NO WAY ALTER THESE BASIC AND UNACCEPTABLE CONSEQUENCES. INDEED, IN SOME RESPECT THEY EXACERBATE THEM. THE SOVIETS, PRESUMABLY FOR PURPOSES OF AFFECTING PUBLIC OPINION, HAVE DESIGNED THEIR APPROACH SO THAT A NUMBER OF MODIFICATIONS COULD BE MADE. THOSE MODIFICATIONS COULD BE USED TO DEMONSTRATE SOVIET "FLEXIBILITY" BUT NONE OF THEM CHANGES THE FUNDAMENTAL SOVIET POSITION IN ANY SIGNIFICANT MANNER.

- THE SOVIET SIDE USED OUR EARLY MEETINGS THIS ROUND TO REPEAT THEIR POSITION AND THEIR CATEGORICAL REJECTION OF THE ZERO-ZERO PROPOSAL. THE SOVIETS TABLED REVISED LANGUAGE FOR THEIR DRAFT TREATY WHICH MAKES EXPLICIT THE MISSILE LAUNCHER SUBCEILING PROPOSAL THAT EMERGED DURING THE FALL ROUND AND WAS DISCLOSED IN DECEMBER BY GENERAL SECRETARY ANDROPOV.

- THE MISSILE LAUNCHER SUBCEILING IS INCLUDED IN THE REVISED DRAFT SOVIET TREATY IN A MANNER THAT EXPLICITLY LINKS THE NUMBER OF SOVIET LRINF MISSILES IN THE EUROPEAN USSR TO THE NUMBER THEY ASCRIBE TO BRITISH AND FRENCH "MEDIUM-RANGE" MISSILES. BY CURRENT SOVIET COUNT, THE BRITISH AND FRENCH NOW HAVE 162 "MEDIUM-RANGE" MISSILE LAUNCHERS. THUS, THE PROPOSED SUBCEILING IS 162.

- INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, AS WE HAVE POINTED OUT TO THE SOVIETS, THE DEFINITION OF SLBM LAUNCHERS IN THEIR OWN DRAFT TREATY WOULD EXCLUDE BRITISH AND FRENCH SLBM'S FROM THE CATEGORY OF "MEDIUM-RANGE" MISSILES. THE SOVIETS HAVE YET TO OVERCOME THIS PROBLEM IN THEIR TREATY .... WE BELIEVE IT WILL BE MOST DIFFICULT FOR

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THEM TO DO SO WITHOUT OPENLY SHOWING THE ARBITRARY MANNER IN WHICH THOSE SYSTEMS WERE INCLUDED.

- THE SOVIETS HAVE INDICATED THAT 162 IS NOT A FIXED SUBCEILING. THE FIGURE WOULD BE RAISED OR LOWERED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CHANGES IN THE LEVEL OF UNITED KINGDOM AND FRENCH "MEDIUM-RANGE" MISSILES. SUCH CHANGES COULD OCCUR EITHER PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO FORCE OF AN AGREEMENT OR AFTERWARDS. IF THE UNITED KINGDOM OR FRANCE CHANGED THE NUMBER OF ITS MISSILES AFTER AN AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO FORCE, THE SOVIET-PROPOSED AGREED MINUTE WOULD PROVIDE THE MECHANISM BY WHICH THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION WOULD CONSULT ON THE QUANTITATIVE OR QUALITATIVE CHANGES IN THE "MEDIUM-RANGE" NUCLEAR ARMS OF BRITAIN AND FRANCE. WHEN ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE NUMBERS OF BRITISH OR FRENCH MISSILES INCREASED BUT THE UNITED STATES DID NOT AGREE IN THE RESULTING CONSULTATIONS TO A CORRESPONDING INCREASE IN THE SUBCEILING, THE SOVIETS INDICATED THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD PUT PRESSURE ON THE BRITISH AND FRENCH, AND IF IN THE END THAT WAS TO NO AVAIL, THE SOVIETS COULD ALWAYS WITHDRAW FROM THE TREATY.

- CONTRARY TO WHAT COULD BE INFERRED FROM GENERAL SECRETARY ANDROPOV'S DECEMBER 21 SPEECH, THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT PROPOSED SEPARATE CEILINGS FOR MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT. THE MISSILE SUBCEILING IS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE OVERALL AGGREGATE OF 300 "MEDIUM-RANGE" SYSTEMS. THIS WOULD LEAVE A RESIDUAL FIGURE OF 138 FOR AIRCRAFT, BUT THEY HAVE NOT PROPOSED A SUBCEILING ON AIRCRAFT. BY CURRENT SOVIET COUNT, THE BRITISH AND FRENCH HAVE SOME 90 "MEDIUM-RANGE" AIRCRAFT, WHICH WOULD LEAVE THE UNITED STATES ABOUT 45 DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT IN EUROPE.

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- THE LACK OF FORTHCOMINGNESS ON THE SOVIET SIDE HAS BEEN PARTICULARLY REFLECTED IN THEIR RELUCTANCE TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF THEIR OWN POSITION. AN ALL TOO COMMON RESPONSE TO OUR QUESTIONS ON CRITICAL ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IS THAT THEY ARE SIMPLY "DETAILS," TO BE DISCUSSED OR REVEALED TO THE UNITED STATES ONLY AFTER WE ACCEPT THE SOVIET FRAMEWORK FOR AGREEMENT.

- ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES, THERE HAVE BEEN REPORTS OF SUGGESTIONS OR HINTS FROM MOSCOW DURING THE RECESS THAT NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS MIGHT BE FORTHCOMING; FOR EXAMPLE, THAT SOME SS-20'S MIGHT BE DESTROYED AND THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT HAVE SOME SPECIFIC THOUGHTS WITH REGARD TO COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER RANGE INF MISSILES. WE HAVE PRESSED THE SOVIETS ON THESE ISSUES FOR CLARIFICATIONS.

- WE PROBED THE SOVIETS TO SEE IF THERE WAS ANYTHING TO REPORT THAT THE MISSILE SUBCEILING PROPOSAL MIGHT ENTAIL THE DESTRUCTION OF SOME SS-20 MISSILES. THERE IS NOTHING IN THE SOVIET POSITION AS PRESENTED TO DATE THAT WOULD REQUIRE THE DESTRUCTION OF A SINGLE SS-20. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS HAVE GIVEN NO INDICATION THAT THEY ARE READY TO DESTROY SS-20'S; INDEED, THEY RESIST OUR ATTEMPTS TO GET THEM TO SAY THAT SOME SS-20'S WOULD BE DESTROYED. WHAT THEY HAVE SAID IS THAT DOZENS OF SS-20'S WOULD BE "REDUCED." BEYOND THAT, THEY HAVE MAINTAINED ONLY THAT DESTRUCTION WILL BE THE PRIMARY METHOD OF REDUCTION. THEY REFUSE TO OFFER A FIGURE FOR THE PERCENTAGE OF SYSTEMS THAT WOULD BE WITHDRAWN. BY OUR CALCULATIONS, GIVEN THE CURRENT NUMBERS OF SS-4 AND SS-5 MISSILES AND BADGER AND BLINDER AIRCRAFT, A WITHDRAWAL PERCENTAGE ON THE ORDER OF 15 PERCENT WOULD BE HIGH ENOUGH TO PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW ALL THE SS-20'S THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE REDUCED UNDER THEIR PROPOSAL. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIETS AT SOME LATER POINT WILL MAKE A GESTURE BY OFFERING TO DESTROY SOME SS-20'S, AND WE NEED TO BE CAREFUL TO AVOID PROVIDING THEM WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT THIS

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PUBLICLY AS SOVIET MOVEMENT.

- WITH REGARD TO COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER RANGE INF MISSILES, THE SOVIETS HAVE FORMALLY GIVEN US NO DETAILS OR CLARIFICATION BEYOND WHAT THEY SAID IN THE FALL ROUND, I.E., THAT SUCH LIMITS WOULD BE QUANTITATIVE AND WOULD APPLY TO THE SS-12 AND PERSHING I. INFORMALLY, THE SOVIETS HAVE SUGGESTED THEY COULD DISCUSS BOTH QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER RANGE INF MISSILES PROVIDED WE WERE READY TO ADDRESS THEM ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS.

- THE SOVIETS HAVE ALSO SUGGESTED INFORMALLY THAT THEY MAY HAVE SOME FLEXIBILITY WITH REGARD TO AIRCRAFT LIMITATIONS AND MODIFICATIONS OF THE 80 DEGREES EAST LONGITUDE WITHDRAWAL LINE FOR LRINF MISSILES IF THE UNITED STATES MADE PROPOSALS ON THESE SUBJECTS, I.E., ACCEPTING THE SOVIET FRAMEWORK FOR AN AGREEMENT.

- IN ADDITION TO TABLING REVISED DRAFT TREATY LANGUAGE, THE SOVIETS ALSO TABLED THEIR OWN DRAFT MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A DATA BASE. WHILE THERE ARE SOME AMBIGUITIES IN THE PROPOSED M.O.U., IT DOES NOTABLY PROVIDE THAT THE LOCATIONS OF DEPLOYED "MEDIUM-RANGE" SYSTEMS WOULD BE SPECIFIED AS WELL AS THEIR NUMBER, A NEW STEP FOR THE SOVIETS. AGAIN, HOWEVER, THE RESPONSE TO MANY OF OUR QUESTIONS ABOUT THE WORKINGS OF THE M.O.U. WAS THAT SUCH DETAILS COULD BE DISCUSSED ONCE THE UNITED STATES ACCEPTED THE SOVIET POSITION.

- THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN HESITANT TO PROCEED IN OTHER AREAS AS WELL.

- -- THEY HAVE NOT RESPONDED FORMALLY TO OUR PROPOSAL TO CONSTITUTE A JOINT VERIFICATION WORKING GROUP WITH THE FIRST TASK OF DEVELOPING DESTRUCTION

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- MEASURES. THEY HAVE INFORMALLY INDICATED THEY  
- ARE NOT WILLING TO FORM SUCH A GROUP AT THIS  
- TIME, ARGUING THAT SUCH A STEP WOULD BE  
- PREMATURE.

- -- THE SOVIETS HAVE NOT RESPONDED FORMALLY TO  
- OUR DRAFT AGREEMENT ON THE ADVANCE NOTIFICATION  
- OF LRINF BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHES OR TO  
- OUR PROPOSAL TO FORM A JOINT WORKING GROUP TO  
- DEVELOP SUCH AN AGREEMENT. AGAIN, THEY HAVE  
- INFORMALLY INDICATED THEY ARE UNWILLING  
- TO PROCEED WITH SUCH WORK, BELIEVING THE  
- NEGOTIATION OF SUCH A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING  
- MEASURE TO BE PREMATURE.

- -- IN THE TREATY TEXT WORKING GROUP, THE SOVIETS  
- HAVE SOUGHT ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION OF SECTIONS  
- ALREADY DISCUSSED IN THE THIRD ROUND. THEY  
- HAVE BEEN WILLING, HOWEVER, TO BEGIN TO  
- ADDRESS THE RESPECTIVE DRAFT ARTICLES OF THE  
- TWO SIDES ON VERIFICATION.

- -- IN THE DATA EXPERTS GROUP, THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN  
- SLOW TO AGREE TO SCHEDULING MEETINGS AND THEN  
- HAVE ATTEMPTED TO DISCUSS MAINLY PROCEDURAL  
- ISSUES. THEY HAVE INTRODUCED SOME QUESTIONS  
- OF THEIR OWN, POSSIBLY REALIZING THAT THEY HAD  
- BACKED THEMSELVES INTO A CORNER ON THE ISSUES  
- DISCUSSED LAST ROUND. THE SOVIETS NOW ASSERT  
- THEY HAVE APPLIED A COMMON FLIGHT PROFILE  
- FOR THE F-4 AND FENCER AND, TO NO ONE'S  
- SURPRISE, CONCLUDED THE F-4 GOES FARTHER THAN  
- 1000 KILOMETERS AND THE FENCER DOES NOT.  
- WE ARE PRESSING FOR A JOINT COMPARISON ON  
- THIS QUESTION.

## SOVIET ATTITUDE

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- THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN CONFIDENT TO THE POINT OF SMUGNESS IN THEIR ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. THEY GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY THINK THEIR "PEACE OFFENSIVE" IS SUCCEEDING AND THAT THEY NEED DO NOTHING MORE THAN BIDE THEIR TIME UNTIL WE MOVE TOWARD THEIR POSITION.

- AS AN EXAMPLE, A RECENT SOVIET PLENARY STATEMENT RESPONDED TO AN EARLIER ONE BY US REGARDING THE UNITED STATES PERCEPTION OF THE BALANCE IN "MEDIUM-RANGE" FORCES. THE SOVIET STATEMENT -- MOCKING IN TONE -- ASSERTED A BALANCE OF FIVE FIGURES TO ZERO IN FAVOR OF THE UNITED STATES WHEN COMPARING U.S. SYSTEMS WHICH COULD STRIKE THE USSR AND WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WITH SOVIET SYSTEMS THAT COULD STRIKE U.S. TERRITORY.

- THE SOVIETS HAVE STATED THAT THE UNITED STATES NEEDS AN AGREEMENT MORE THAN THEY DO AND HAVE FELT FREE TO STALL OPENLY IN SEVERAL AREAS OF WORK AS WELL AS TO REFUSE TO EXPLAIN FULLY THE WORKINGS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR OWN PROPOSAL.

- THE SOVIETS' INTRANSIGENT ATTITUDE WAS ALSO REFLECTED IN THEIR RESPONSE TO OUR DISCUSSION OF BASIC CRITERIA AND OUR IMPLICIT INVITATION FOR A SOVIET PROPOSAL THAT MEETS THOSE CRITERIA. RATHER THAN ACCEPTING THIS AS A SIGNAL OF OUR READINESS TO CONSIDER ANY SERIOUS COUNTERPROPOSAL, THE SOVIETS REJECTED THE CRITERIA, ASSERTING THEY WERE BASED ON FULLY UPHOLDING THE ZERO-ZERO PROPOSAL.

- SOVIET STATEMENTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE ALSO BECOME INCREASINGLY POLEMICAL, CHARGING THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT WANT AN AGREEMENT AT ALL. WHEN I NOTED NATO'S POLICY WAS ONE OF PEACE THROUGH DETERRENCE, KVITSINSKIY TERMED THE POLICY PEACE THROUGH INTIMIDATION. AT THE SAME TIME, THEIR CONFIDENCE APPARENTLY STRETCHED TO THE POINT WHERE THEY FEEL THEY CAN STATE THAT NO NEGOTIATED OUTCOME ALLOWING THE DEPLOYMENT OF ANY UNITED STATES MISSILES WOULD

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BE ACCEPTABLE.

- VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S FEBRUARY 4 VISIT AND HIS REITERATION OF THE UNITED STATES GOAL OF ACHIEVING A DURABLE AND EFFECTIVE AGREEMENT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE HAD NO DISCERNIBLE IMPACT ON THE SOVIET SIDE. THEIR ARGUMENTS REMAIN UNCHANGED, AND THEY HAVE RATHER LIGHTLY DISMISSED THEIR MEETING WITH THE VICE PRESIDENT AND HIS TRIP IN GENERAL.

SUMMARY

- GIVEN THE SOVIET ATTITUDE AND APPARENT FAITH THAT THEIR "PEACE OFFENSIVE" IS SUCCEEDING, A UNITED STAND BY THE ALLIANCE IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER. CONVINCING THE SOVIETS THAT THEIR PUBLIC PLOYS WILL NOT SUCCEED IN SHAKING OUR DETERMINATION IS CRITICAL TO GETTING THEM TO DROP THEIR INTRANSIGENT ATTITUDE AND TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY IN GENEVA.

- THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION WILL CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO BRING THE SOVIETS TO ADDRESS THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS THAT PROMPTED THE 1979 DECISION. AS WE HAVE CONTINUALLY POINTED OUT TO THEM, THE PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE THE ENTIRE CLASS OF UNITED STATES AND SOVIET LRINF MISSILES WOULD DIRECTLY RESOLVE THE GREATEST INF CONCERN OF THE SOVIET UNION -- THE PROSPECTIVE DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES PERSHING II AND GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES -- AS WELL AS NATO CONCERNS OVER THE THREAT OF SOVIET LRINF MISSILES. IT IS INCUMBENT ON THEM TO MAKE A SIMILAR EFFORT TO ADDRESS NATO'S SECURITY CONCERNS. IF THE SOVIETS MAKE SUCH AN EFFORT, THE DOOR IS OPEN AND WE ARE READY AND EAGER TO CONSIDER THEIR COUNTERPROPOSAL.

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- AT THIS TIME, I'D BE HAPPY TO ADDRESS ANY  
QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE. END TEXT NITZE STATEMENT.  
BENNETT

END OF MESSAGE

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